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Abstract 
 
Software is not developed in a vacuum. Development 
teams and organizations must react to various incidents, 
such as changes in personnel, development practices, 
project objectives, and business environment, and all 
kinds of delays occurring during large-scale software 
development projects. These incidents challenge 
contemporary communication, collaboration and 
development practices. They also require an ability to 
adapt to the new situation. We argue that the problems 
in reacting to those incidents and the inability in 
implementing corrective actions are the main reasons 
for software project failures. We identify four drivers of 
collaboration. They are named as contract, individual 
person, group of collaborators, and development 
process, each being appropriate in different points of 
time. Yet their emphasis and appropriateness vary over 
time. This emphasizes the developers’ ability to transit 
between the drivers of collaboration. 
 
Keywords: information systems development, incidents, 
collaboration, project management  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Contemporary software development takes place in 
networks of people. Programmers, systems designers, 
and other actors collaborate within and across teams and 
organizations, often in global settings. To succeed, they 
need to communicate, coordinate, and interact. Software 
development is increasingly social.  
Single software components and programs are 
developed independently and integrated to serve 
different groups of users and their needs as 
comprehensively as possible. For example, enterprise 
resource planning (ERP) systems are composed of 
different “modules” or “components” for different 
tasks, such as finance, supply chain, stocks, and 
production management. Individual components and 
programs form larger aggregates, which, due to their 
size, are often complex and time-consuming to develop. 
As the components are integrated under the same user 
interface and database, they look like a single system to 
their users, but in reality, they are built as assemblages 
from parts of larger infrastructural building blocks and 
smaller sub systems, or tied through hooks and glue 
code to platforms. The development of such large-scale 
systems requires software development methods and 
practices that handle both the scale and extensive length 
of the project.  
Large-scale software development is seldom 
straightforward and easy. Not only the technical project 
objectives but also non-technical circumstances, such as 
the number of actors, tightness of schedules, and size 
and length of the project make the development process 
complex. The projects are plagued by unexpected 
incidents, caused by the changes in the personnel, 
development practices or project objectives, delays, or 
external events, such as mergers and acquisitions or 
significant changes in the company’s business 
environment. In many cases changes to the platforms 
that the software relies on to run can alter the course of 
development. The success and outcome of long projects 
is dependent on the ability to prepare, react, and recover 
from these incidents. 
Unexpected incidents initiate intentional or 
unintentional changes to the project and its practices. 
These changes easily disrupt software development as 
they cause uncertainties and discontinuities, possibly 
affecting the project objectives or customer 
commitment. However, there is little research about the 
project disruptions over time and their consequences 
[1]. Most studies focus on short-term changes and 
survival strategies [2, 3], not on prolonged projects and 
evolving long-term relationships between the 
stakeholders. Large volume of software engineering 
research focuses on software processes, requirements, 
or communication [1, 4], not on organizational effects 
on the projects. These issues are emphasized in large 
projects where changes are likely to happen. Although 
similar large projects are studied for example in the 
construction context, the abstractness and intangibility 
of software development makes it difficult to apply the 
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findings from other fields in the more intangible 
software context.   
As an example of large-scale software development, 
many ERP projects still fail [5, 6] despite having been 
studied extensively over the past thirty years. The 
studies have mostly focused on success and failure 
factors, short-term activities, and technical issues. We 
take an alternative view. We focus on collaboration 
practices between the software developers and their 
customers in a large-scale ERP development project, 
during which different incidents take place over 
extended period of time. We try to understand why the 
project failed despite several seemingly successful 
attempts to recover from different incidents and crisis.  
The paper is organized as follows. First, we will 
present our research methods and the case description. 
Second, we will summarize our findings and reflect 
them to the literature. Finally, they are discussed in a 
broader context so that conclusions can be made. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
This case study focuses on an ERP system renewal 
project, taking place 2007-2014. We conducted 16 
qualitative interviews in the large manufacturer 
company (12 interviewees) and the smallish ERP 
vendor (4 interviewees). The interviewees were from 
customer IT (Corporate CIO, ICT manager, and three 
technical persons), customer business (five managers 
and two end-users), and vendor organization (CEO and 
three developers), each having participated in the ERP 
system renewal within the last few years. The 
interviewees were selected by using snowball sampling, 
i.e. each person recommended new interviewees [7]. We 
asked each interviewee to tell their story about the 
project, its progress and challenges from his/her 
perspective. These stories, lasting about 49 minutes on 
average, were audio recorded.  
By inductively and iteratively analyzing the 
qualitative stories [8, 9] it became evident that there 
were four different drivers of collaboration, each 
dominating in different points of time. This analysis was 
initially done by the first author, and later collectively 
discussed among all authors. Our findings will be 
discussed next. 
 
3. Case study 
 
The customer organization manufactures consumer 
products in Northern Europe. They have 4500 
employees, with annual worldwide sales of 1400M€ 
(2016). Over the years, the company has grown by 
mergers and acquisitions to more than 3000 sales offices 
in 62 countries. In 2008, they identified a need to renew 
their sales process and its systems support, namely ERP. 
The customer organization (hereafter a customer) had a 
joint history with their ERP provider, dating back to 
1997. The vendor had developed and designed a tailored 
ERP that had been in use ever since. Selecting a renewal 
partner was thus based on a fact that “they knew our 
processes already” (Customer CIO). 
Our case story begins in 2008. The old ERP system 
did not meet the customer’s needs and expectations, and 
it was perceived as technologically outdated. The 
customer and vendor mutually agreed on a renewal 
project (hereafter the project). A contract was signed. It 
defined the project objectives, used technologies, modes 
of project collaboration – and the use of the old ERP as 
a basis for requirements specification. This approach 
turned out to be quite problematic. Customer IT support 
articulated that “the specification that is done with the 
vendor can be just email conversations” while the 
vendor had similar experiences: “Customer has been 
using the old version, and when the specifications were 
fixed, many things have been left unspecified. Of 
course, it has been assumed, by default, that they will be 
the same as earlier' (Vendor Senior designer). No one 
was pleased with the situation. It is worth noting here 
that this is similar to the idea that one would use one 
platform APIs and services as requirements for a new 
platform. This can work in a pure transition from one 
highly standardized platform to another, but not in a 
renewal or major upgrade, or in a radical process 
change. 
Nevertheless, the contract, largely a standard 
agreement between the parties, was signed.  It was 
written more like a memorandum of understanding 
rather than a binding and limiting agreement. This loose 
approach was perceived appropriate because of the 
existing long-term partnership and practices. The 
vendor started to develop a new system. 
Then the global economy declined. The project was 
halted for two years, until June 2010. But the company 
growth did not stop. Its internationalization continued 
with acquiring more sales offices around the world. This 
meant a change in needs and requirements for the new 
ERP. The old ERP lost its role as an example for 
necessary functionality. To convey new needs and 
requirements to the vendor, the customer assigned a 
project manager to work closely with the vendor. This 
changed the relationship between the organizations 
profoundly. Instead of entering a time-consuming re-
negotiation about the contract, they continued the 
project with a mutual understanding of what was the 
target. The project was driven by the will to collaborate, 
not by the formal contract. 
Over the next two years, the project manager 
developed a strong vision of what is ultimately needed. 
Yet he perceived that “strategic and managerial 
planning was challenging because the vendor was not 
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able to present a roadmap… (Phasing) was done as 
hand-to-mouth (for the practical purpose in the IS 
product development) …” Despite these difficulties, he 
developed a vision and communicated it to the vendor 
but did not check its congruence with the customer’s 
strategy and vision well enough. The project 
collaboration was not driven by the organizations, but 
by the project manager personally. 
The project manager was formally employed by the 
customer. However, he was practically working in both 
organizations, understanding their needs, capabilities, 
and limitations. In February 2012, he was even 
appointed to the vendor’s internal board of 
management. Optimally this dual role could have 
resulted in a perfect outcome. Practically, it turned out 
to be a chaos.  
The project manager, being intensively tied with the 
project and with the vendor, had lost his touch to 
business development activities in the customer. The 
customer’s needs had significantly diverged and 
changed over time since more and more sales offices 
were acquired and the business processes had evolved. 
The old ERP, the old vision, and even the new vision 
based on those, had become inappropriate. This was 
highlighted in December 2012, at the time of the first 
roll-out, when the customer CIO postponed the roll-outs 
because of immature ERP. The system was not yet ready 
for use. The project manager resigned in January 2013.  
A new project manager was hired from another 
branch of industry, the highly regulated pharmacy. He 
emphasized his experiences, old customs and software 
development practices which he believed would help in 
overcoming the problems. He thus started to steer the 
project towards strict, defined and implemented 
development processes and practices.  
However, earlier software development practices 
were nothing but defined. The customer IT manager 
concretized this in terms of tracking the ideas: “Now we 
have the practical problem that the ideas are forgotten. 
We have a traditional challenge: (how to manage a 
design process with changes), how to get a centralized 
tracking of the ideas for advancing with these properly 
(until the design and work tasks are incorporated into 
the product development)”. Meanwhile different actors 
collaborated without clear instructions and methods, 
with persons they had earlier been collaborating, 
answering the needs of those who request them the 
most. This created contradictions when the formal 
project manager tried to enforce the strictness of the 
process. The others just continued their old ways of 
working and undefined collaboration. The relationship 
between the customer and the vendor was consequently 
driven by both the process and the customary 
collaboration practices. This contradiction resulted in 
another chaos. After four months, a crisis meeting was 
set to clean the air. 
The customer’s CIO made an intervention, and 
personally tried to steer the project back on track. As he 
brags about having “tricks that all the other [vendor’s] 
tasks will stop if we face that kind of [major] problem”, 
he defined the practices, gave a carrot to the vendor to 
deliver the ERP on time, and commanded the next roll-
out in early May (in three weeks) on five test sites. The 
roll-out was successful in a sense that the system was 
installed. However, it was still far from perfect as more 
than 40 severe faults were identified. This resulted in a 
situation, where “[the customer was] doing a lot of 
testing (on behalf of) [the vendor]. We are identifying 
the defects that they should already have found (in their 
testing environment)” (Customer CIO). 
The vendor continued fixing the bugs and 
developing new features with their outsourcing partner, 
and with the project manager acting as a boundary 
spanner between the customer and the vendor. The 
progress was minimal. The bugs remained, new features 
were continuously expected and expectations failed, and 
new roll-outs were postponed. Although the situation 
annoyed both the customer and the vendor, there was 
mutual understanding. In the words of the vendor 
customer support: “There are still lots of customer 
wishes about what they want. [They express] that they 
want this and that, but we've gone a bit backwards, and 
the customer understands it and agrees that we should 
focus on fixing these”.  
In early November, the CIO made another 
intervention, and summoned another meeting with the 
vendor. This time the contract was re-negotiated. It 
explicitly defined what is needed and when – in early 
January. As the timeline was very strict, the project 
objectives were mitigated. This made the project tight 
but realistic, which all agreed. The managers assumed 
the contract would steer the project to a happy end.  
But it didn’t. The contract neither defined the 
collaboration practices unambiguously nor were they 
clearly communicated. For example, Vendor Customer 
support suggested that they “should have meetings at 
short intervals. As our release cycle is two weeks, we 
have to know what to plan for the next release, and what 
are the most important points there.” Although the 
project advanced significantly by the deadline, the 
progress was not enough. There was still a significant 
number of defects and missing features, even when 
comparing to the old ERP. New features were still about 
to come. Nevertheless, the vendor was happy with the 
progress and was not concerned about these issues. They 
believed the deadlines would be postponed again.  
In early January, the customer CIO made a decision 
to terminate the 18 years long cooperation with the 
vendor. This was despite all others wanting to continue 
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the relationship and get the system ready. The CIO had 
lost his faith, and wanted to start from a blank slate, with 
a new vendor or a system provider. 
 
4. Findings from the case 
 
The case illustrates that at different points of time, 
the organization’s relationship was driven by different 
factors: a contract, an individual person, free-form 
collaboration practices, or a development process. They 
are defined as follows:  
• Contracts define roles and responsibilities, and 
how different incidents are handled. 
• Individual person can personally react to the 
incidents and their consequences.  
• Collaboration relies on mutual interests, voluntary 
cooperation, and previous experiences. Incidents 
and their consequences are solved by the 
stakeholders’ common points of interests.  
• Process determines the parties and procedures, and 
how the incidents and their consequences are 
resolved.   
Table 1 illustrates the main project phases, incidents 
and different drivers for the relationship. 
Each driver in Table 1 has been found appropriate in 
earlier literature. For example, Esteves & Pastor-
Collado [10] identified the importance of an individual 
person for the success of ERP projects. Similarly, 
Saunders et al. [11]  have emphasized contracts, 
Kotlarsky & Oshri [12] smooth and flexible 
collaboration and information exchange between the 
stakeholders, and Fitzgerald et al. [13] appropriate 
development process. It thus seems that the corrective 
actions to save the project were proven elsewhere. Why 
did this project then fail? 
Although there were several problems, such as poor 
communication, undefined or ad hoc development 
practices, or powerless management, they were not the 
main sources of failures. Considering the timeline of the 
project, from 2007 to 2014, five years with a break, is 
long enough to make the corrective actions, and 
implement them appropriately. Those actions were 
made indeed. The problem was thus elsewhere, in their 
implementation, and in the transitions from one action 
and collaboration mode to the other. 
The need to change the development and 
collaboration practices were triggered by different 
incidents. For example, when the old project manager 
resigned, his dominant role and in-depth knowledge of 
both the customer and the vendor could not be easily 
replaced. This had both positive and negative effects. 
The customer braced the project manager’s ability “to 
emphasize the development priorities from our 
perspective. I led the opinions when there was a decision 
point… based on our expectations“ (Customer project 
manager) and being informed about the vendor’s 
problems, challenges, and directions. On the other hand, 
the project manager “had things so well under control 
because he has such a long history and he was involved 
with developing the old system. Now the whole 
initiative has not been under control in the same way 
even though the IT team is very professional' (Vendor 
Customer support). When the role disappeared, it 
obligated significant changes in the other actors’ 
practices. They were not ready for the change and its 
entailing practices, enforced by the new project 
manager. The reaction to the incident failed. The 
 
Table 1. Main phases of the project and collaboration drivers 
Time Activities and incidents Collaboration driver 
2008 Initiation Contract 
2008-10 Project halted - 
June 2010 Restart; Assigning a project manager Collaboration 
Feb 2012 Project manager appointed to the 
vendor’s board of management 
Personally by the project manager  
Dec 2012 Initial roll-out  
Jan 2013 Project manager resigns  
 New project manager enters  Defined development process 
April 2013 Crisis meeting because of conflicting 
collaboration drivers  
Process and collaboration 
 CIO makes an intervention  Personally by CIO 
May 2013 Initial roll-out to 5 sites; numerous 
bugs 
Defined development process, influenced by ad-hoc 
collaboration practices 
Nov 2013 CIO makes an intervention  Personally by CIO, continue by the contract 
Jan 2014 Termination of the contract Personally by CIO 
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problem was thus not the incident but the actors’ 
inability to react to it. 
Large-scale software development projects are not 
implemented in vacuum. All kinds of incidents are 
possible and common; people may resign or sign in the 
project, organizations and environments evidently 
change, technologies advance, and development 
methods and management isms are replaced. This 
means that large-scale projects, potentially lasting 
several years, will evidently face these incidents. To 
cope with them is not easy and straightforward as our 
case illustrates (see also [14]). Yet the research has not 
paid attention to long-term relationships and their 
evolution, despite the number of failures [5, 6]. This 
ignorance could be one of the reasons why the 
organizations do not learn from past mistakes. They are 
not capable of reacting to incidents appropriately. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Our analysis revealed that the main reasons for the 
project failure were collaboration breakdowns in the 
transitions between the incidents. The incidents; 
financial crisis, the board membership and resignation 
of the project manager, roll-outs and materializing of the 
defects, and CIO interventions all affected the software 
development project. Meanwhile the developers at the 
vendor side and the IT workforce at the customer side 
continued their informal collaboration practices that had 
been successful during the past 13+ years. The 
implementation of corrective actions after the incidents 
failed.  
The implementation of a change in collaboration is 
not easy in a hectic development project. Neves et al. 
[14] addressed several characteristics that affect large 
scale IT projects. They range from traditional project 
management issues such as creeping requirements, 
prolonged schedules and increasing costs to divergent 
perspectives on IT project management and its 
performance. Although we observed similar kind of 
variety in the perspectives of project management 
performance, we argue this disparity was not the source 
of failure. Development practices and ways of 
collaboration are often set at the beginning of the project 
and defined by contracts. Yet, especially in large-scale 
development projects, both external and internal 
incidents will occur and influence the project. This 
necessitates sensitivity to identify the incidents, 
responsiveness to them, adaptability to new needs, and 
ability to change the development practices as 
appropriate. For example, the financial crisis made the 
original contract and requirements specification 
obsolete. The appointment of the project manager to the 
board of managers overemphasized his role, which, to 
be successful, would have necessitated new working 
methods at the customer’s side. We argue that the 
problems in reacting to different incidents and 
implementing corrective actions are the main reasons 
for collaboration breakdowns in software development. 
In large-scale projects, instead of focusing on rigid 
development practices or fine-tuning the contract, all 
participating organizations should also concentrate on 
evident incidents and how they are dealt with. This, in 
turn, emphasizes the social side of development; how all 
parties, at the customer side, at the vendor side, and at 
other stakeholders, react and response to incidents and 
corrective actions. The key to the success is on the 
developers’ and other stakeholders’ ability to adapt and 
change the driver of collaboration that may help in 
avoiding collaboration breakdowns.  
Somsen et al. [15] came to similar conclusions. They 
emphasized the technological understanding and agility 
in project management practices, whereas we argue that 
the problem is not the technology but the ability to react 
to different incidents, i.e. being agile in terms of 
changing the collaboration driver. The importance of 
managing complex relationships, of which the large-
scale software development projects necessitate, has 
also been addressed (e.g. [16]). Yet again, the focus is 
on a single driver, not on transition between the 
collaboration drivers.   
We consequently suggest two contributions. First, 
we argue there is a need for new approaches to 
understand the failures in IS projects. It seems that we, 
as IS researchers, have studied the them from the 
managerial point of view without understanding the 
evident transitions between the managerial activities or 
development practices. A need for studying the 
dynamics and transitions in collaboration situations is 
thus evident. Second, our small study provides a few 
lessons. They can be formulated as follows: 
• Prepare for evident incidents and react accordingly 
sooner than later. 
• Ensure that the corrective action is properly 
implemented throughout the developer community 
and monitor that the new collaboration driver is 
respected and obeyed. 
• Remember that the transitions between the drivers 
of collaboration will not happen instantly but will 
take time and face external pressures not to 
change. 
• Do not adhere the old collaboration driver 
(contract, person, cooperation, process) too long as 
the new situation, after the incident, most likely 
requires new methods and modes of collaboration.  
Recovering from different collaboration 
breakdowns are the keys to the success in large-scale 
software development projects. 
There are some limitations in this study. First, our 
findings are based only on a single company and a single 
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case. This means all possible drivers of collaboration 
may have not been identified. However, we do not 
consider this as a problem since we were more interested 
in the transitions between the drivers. Second, although 
we interviewed the key actors in the project at its later 
stages, the interviews were retrospective. This means 
the interviewees may not be able to recall all incidents 
and activities that took place years before. However, we 
were still able to construct the big picture and the 
timeline of events. So, although some details may be 
missing, collaboration drivers and the transitions were 
unanimously confirmed by the interviewees. 
Different incidents are indeed evident in large 
development projects. Those projects range from ERP 
renewal projects (as in this case) and large software 
development projects to all kinds of platforms and their 
development and integration. The foci of actions there 
should not be only on narrow project management 
practices but also on the agility to change the 
collaboration practice, mode. The larger the project, the 
more significant this becomes.  
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